Defense spending and economic growth: evidence from China, 1952–2012

This paper examines whether defense expenditures contributed to economic growth in China for the 1952–2012 period. We examine the contribution of defense to economic growth using recently published official data on economic activity, defense, and government expenditures. We employ the Feder-Ram and augmented Solow models of economic growth to explore the defense-growth relationship. The Feder-Ram model appears to poorly explain economic growth in China. The augmented Solow model suggests, however, that a 1% increase in defense expenditures raises the economic growth rate by approximately 0.15–0.19%.     

美国网络安全战略管理体系分析

文章从美国政府颁布的政策文件、法律法规和各机构部门的职能三个方面,对美国网络安全战略管理体系进行了介绍和分析。     

基于嵌入式Web的HART仪表远程控制系统

为解决有线HART仪表在恶劣环境中远程传输时易受影响、成本高等问题,结合嵌入式linux系统在远程工业控制中的应用,提出了一种基于嵌入式Web的HART仪表远程控制系统。采用S3C2440处理器和DM9000网络芯片,在嵌入式系统上移植Boa Web服务器,并运用CGI技术实现动态网页控制。利用该控制系统,客户只需在室内通过浏览器即可对HART仪表进行远程监控,且不需要专门的组态软件。     

POWER,INFLUENCE, AND HIERARCHY: DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD

The global defense‐industrial sector reflects the hierarchy of power in the post‐Cold War world. As in the larger international system, the United States plays the dominant role in the defense sector as well. It is a comparative advantage often used by US policymakers to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. Curiously, the radical concentration of the world’s defense industrial sector, as described here, has received relatively little scrutiny from either academia or the media, even though it not only reflects the international order but provides the United States with considerable leverage in it.     

Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences

We study the behavior of defense spending in Switzerland over 1975–2001. Our main interest is in determining how neutrality in international affairs (non‐membership in military alliances) affects defense spending. We find that neutrality is associated with a perception of lower levels of external threat; hence it confers economic benefits in the form of a smaller defense burden. However, neutrality does not fully insulate a country from variations in the level of external threat in the global system as perceived by members of military alliances. Swiss defense spending has tracked very closely the spending trends – but at a lower average level – of the United States and other NATO countries. To the extent that post‐Cold War threats, such as international terrorism, materialize primarily in the context of existing security alliances, Swiss military spending patterns observed in 1975–2001 are likely to remain the same in the future.     

ON THE USE OF TERROR WEAPONS VERSUS MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some of the most active arms races are taking place between developed and less developed countries. The inability of less developed countries to compete financially, as well as technologically, with developed countries may be forcing the former to acquire terror weapons (TWP). The Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the events of 9/11 proved that the use of TWP is no longer a mere threat; there are several organizations and countries that will not hesitate to use them. This study develops a model of resource allocation in an arms race between a developed country that is characterized by state‐of‐the‐art technology and high GDP, and a less developed country whose technological capability and GDP are much lower. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries that are engaged in the arms race. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use.     

TAX EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY/QUANTITY TRADE‐OFFS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT*

In this article the effect of defense spending on aggregate output is discussed. Recent publications in this area are reviewed and new additional evidence is provided. The findings presented in this paper are supportive of the positive effect of defense spending. However, in light of the contrary evidence presented in other papers, empirical evidence taken as a whole, suggests that a definitive conclusion about the effect of defense spending at this time should be avoided.     

Defense spending and economic growth across the Taiwan straits: a threshold regression model

This paper employs both linear and non‐linear models to investigate the relationship between national defense spending and economic growth for Taiwan and China. Using data from 1953–2000 on defense spending, GDP, import, export and capital, we find that China's defense spending leads that of Taiwan. There exists the phenomenon of an arms race between both countries when official Chinese data are used. On the one hand, feedback relations prevail between economic growth and defense spending growth in Taiwan. On the other hand, China's national defense is found to lead economic growth.     

Preserving defense technologies: A strategy for economic conversion†

This paper presents a model for converting legacy defense production facilities into private‐sector economic resources. Specifically, this paper will examine as a case study the first successful conversion of a former U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons production installation, including reasons for its success, its costs and benefits, and lessons for public policy. It is envisioned that this model may be useful for mitigating local economic hardship resulting from defense “downsizing” and for privatizing production capacities critical for national defense.     

Public opinion: A powerful predictor of U.S. defense spending

Public opinion survey responses regarding the desirability of changes in defense spending can be compressed into a single variable, the public opinion balance, which, when accompanied by a control variable measuring the proportion of responses in the “residuum” (no opinion or keep the status quo), permits an accurate prediction of subsequent changes in the rate of change of U.S. defense outlays from the mid‐1960s through the 1980s. This finding cannot be interpreted as a simple case of “the public got what it wanted,” however, because public opinion was not autonomous or spontaneous, and defense decision makers themselves played a central role in shaping public opinion.